Bringing the provinces back in: Re-evaluating the relevance of province-building to theories of Canadian  federalism and multi-level governance by Wilder, Matt & Howlett, Michael
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 3, 2015-2016, 1-34 
Bringing the provinces back in: 
Re-evaluating the relevance of province-building to theories of Canadian  
federalism and multi-level governance 
 
Matt Wilder 
University of Toronto 
 
Michael Howlett  
Simon Fraser University 
and the National University of Singapore 
  
 
Three decades have passed since Canadian political scientists last seriously engaged with the concept of 
province-building. Popular in the 1970s as a means for explaining patterns of policy-making and 
constitutional politics in Canada, the currency of province-building met an abrupt end after its 
analytical use was questioned by Young, Faucher and Blais in 1984. Thirty years on, this discussion 
piece revisits their critique and, far from finding the idea void of empirical validity or theoretical utility, 
suggests that province-building continues to best capture the general structure of policy formulation and 
implementation in Canada and provides lessons for how to examine matters of authority and decision-
making in multi-level settings.  
 
Trois décennies se sont écoulées depuis que les scientifiques politiques Canadiens dernière sérieusement 
engagé avec le concept de ‘province-building.’ Populaire dans les années 1970 comme un moyen pour 
expliquer les tendances de l'élaboration des politiques et la politique constitutionnelle au Canada, la 
monnaie de province-building a rencontré une fin abrupte après son utilisation analytique a été 
interrogé par Young, Faucher et Blais en 1984. Trente ans plus tard, cette discussion revisite leur 
critique et, loin de trouver le vide d'idée de validité empirique ou l'utilité théorique, suggère que 
province-building continue de mieux saisir la structure générale de la formulation des politiques et la 
mise en œuvre au Canada et offre des leçons sur la façon d'examiner les questions d'autorité et de dans 
des contextes multi-niveaux de prise de décision.  
 
Introduction 
 Introduced in the 1960s as an alternative to understanding Canadian economic and social 
development as something determined predominantly by the central government, the “province-
building” perspective aimed to account for the ways in which provincial governments also acted to 
structure Canadian society. Normatively, the originators of the province-building idea objected to the 
“modernity thesis,” which suggested that technological advancement coordinated by ever-expanding 
central governments would bring about the obsolescence of sub-national governments in federal systems 
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(Laski, 1939; Brady, 1940; Livingston, 1956; Corry, 1958). In contrast to this perspective, which 
dominated post-war academic discourse on Canadian federalism, proponents of the province-building 
perspective argued that the provinces had oftentimes been, and would continue to be, the primary actors 
formulating, implementing and financing many health, social welfare, education, transportation and 
other important policy programmes in Canada, and that their role in country-building deserved much 
closer inquiry (Black and Cairns, 1966; Smiley, 1962).  
Accounting for the dynamics of multi-level governance has, however, always proved challenging 
for students of Canadian federalism. Despite widespread interest in the provinces as a unit of analysis 
among Canadian political scientists since the 1960s (Atkinson et al., 2013; Brownsey and Howlett, 
2001; Chandler and Chandler, 1979; Dunn, 2008), three decades have passed since “province-building” 
has had any currency as a theoretical concept in academic discourse. We argue this fate was attributable 
to two developments. The first was empirical and had to do with a reduction in the fiscal capacity of all 
Canadian governments to engage in large-scale programme development by the mid-1980s, which 
muted many of the trends obvious in previous decades. The second was conceptual and attributable in 
large measure to a well-articulated critique by Robert Young, Philippe Faucher and André Blais — 
hereafter referred to as YFB —calling both the empirical and conceptual veracity of the province-
building concept into question. 
 Notwithstanding these developments, the intuitive appeal of province-building for students of 
Canadian federalism, public policy, and public administration as a counterpoint to more centralist views 
of nation-building has meant the use of the concept has never been entirely lost, as various perspectives 
on Canadian intergovernmental relations, economic history, and geography either tacitly or explicitly 
assume a strong role for provincial governments. Newer models of public administration and urban 
politics based on collaborative and devolved or “place-based” governance similarly have focused their 
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attention on sub-national actors (Conteh, 2013; Courchene, 1995; Kernaghan, 2009; Stoney and 
Graham, 2009). Meanwhile, recent patterns of policy development indicate that the influence of 
provincial governments is once again on the rise (Simmons and Graefe, 2013), as initiatives in primary 
resource extraction, transportation, and technological and knowledge-based sectors are demonstrative of 
provincial leadership in many high profile and emergent policy areas (Howse and Chandler, 1997; 
Marchildon and McNutt, 2007; Phillips, 2007). This suggests the time is ripe to revisit the empirical and 
conceptual foundations of the province-building concept.  
 A re-evaluation of the province-building hypothesis and YFB’s 1984 critique in light of 
developments both old and new is the aim of this discussion and commentary. Our argument rests on the 
premise that, while the critique delivered by YFB was in many ways convincing, it was misinformed in 
important respects and has been proven incorrect in others. Conceptually, the critique can be criticized 
for focusing on a very narrow definition of province-building and for holding this narrow interpretation 
to a much greater empirical threshold than appropriate. The discussion also challenges YFB’s 
conclusions and evidentiary findings in light of changes and developments in intergovernmental 
relations and the structure of the Canadian political economy since they wrote in the early 1980s.  
 In what follows, we revisit the conceptual and six-point empirical critique leveled by YFB at the 
province-building concept. We then resituate the original province-building concept in relation to more 
recent developments in the theoretical and empirical literature on Canadian government and politics. In 
doing so, we conclude that the concept of province-building is more relevant and useful than ever. 
  
A Contested Concept? The faces of province-building, 1966-1984 
 Disagreeing with the assessment given by advocates of province-building, Young, Faucher and 
Blais held that the perspective suffered from several weaknesses. To begin with, YFB argued that 
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province-building inflates the significance of common efforts to preserve provincial areas of jurisdiction 
while conflating “defensively expansionist western revenues with Quebec’s peculiar cultural and 
economic concerns, the Maritimes’ blustering subordination, Newfoundland’s desperate optimism, and 
Ontario’s fundamentally ambivalent role in the federation.” From an analytical standpoint, YFB 
contended province-building did not meet the threshold of being theoretically or even conceptually 
fulsome, but rather constituted “merely a rhetorical device or a loose, albeit congenial, description.” As 
YFB put it, “for complex concepts to have any validity, the elements which they subsume must be found 
together… if they are not, using such a concept is like having a category or syndrome called ‘measles’ 
when sufferers sometimes get red spots and sometimes do not” (Young, Faucher and Blais, 1984: 814).  
 Evaluating the degree to which YFB’s characterization of province-building captures the reality 
of its use leading up to their 1984 critique requires revisiting the foundational province-building 
literature and exploring its evolution. In doing so, we find that many of YFB’s reservations about the 
province-building perspective stemmed from several undeserved generalizations made by them about 
this literature. We return to the question of the theoretical and conceptual utility of the perspective after 
a point-by-point review of the YFB critique.  
 
The Classical Works on Province-Building Post 1966 
The modern notion of province-building was articulated by Edwin Black and Alan Cairns in 
1966 and reflected the institutionalist leanings of these authors.1 Writing from “the periphery” in British 
Columbia, they argued “a different perspective on Canadian federalism” was required to counter-weight 
the then-prevalent centralist and federal-centric reading of Canadian economic and political 
development in Canadian academe (Black and Cairns, 1966: 29). Crucially, Black and Cairns suggested 
viewing Canadian political history as an oscillating pendulum that swung between periods of central and 
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provincial leadership. “Adding these perspectives to the more usual approaches,” they argued, “will 
provide better explanations of Canadian politics than those to which we have been accustomed,” with 
province-building being an accompaniment to, rather than a contender to replace, the common centralist 
image of the evolution of Canadian federalism put forward by scholars such as Dawson (1965) or 
Mallory (1965).  
Writing from Central Canada, Donald Smiley agreed with this view and contended in 1973 that 
the province-building phenomenon had extensive empirical roots with “relatively unsatisfactory 
performance of the Canadian economy from the late 1950s onward project[ing] the provinces in widely 
varying degrees into a more active role in economic management than ever before” (Smiley, 1973: 562). 
Over a decade later, Chandler and Bakvis (1989: 63) reiterated this view, arguing that “there can be little 
doubt that after three decades of public sector expansion, the provinces regularly display both a 
competence and willingness to intervene in economic affairs that has ended the dominance of Ottawa in 
federal-provincial relations... more important, provincial activity has altered, perhaps irreversibly, the 
nature of Canadian federalism and is at the root of the modern dilemmas of workability in 
intergovernmental relations.”  
 Parallel themes prevalent in Canadian political science at the time, namely work in the political 
economy tradition, joined in this challenge to the prevailing historical and institutionalist orthodoxy 
(Albo and Jenson, 1989), eventually coalescing in the articulation of a “province-building framework” 
that later became the subject of YFB’s critique. Stevenson (1977 and 1979), for example, argued that 
province-building was distinct from country-building in that the former was attributable to the interests 
and objectives of provincial elites, encouraged by a mentality of defensive expansionism from political 
and economic forces both within Canada and without, while the latter was directed primarily toward 
developing greater internal interdependence, albeit with a distinct Central Canadian flavour. In 
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somewhat similar fashion, a variant of Canadian political economy emblematic of the work of Larry 
Pratt and John Richards promoted an image of the provincial state as semi-autonomous to societal 
pressure. According to this view, government elites at the provincial level were able to recapture 
monopoly power from key (resource-based) economic actors by gaining their own unique form of 
economic expertise over the course of repeated complex interactions with business (Pratt, 1977 and 
1981; Richards and Pratt, 1979).  Chandler and Chandler (1979: 12) noted this was not a recent 
development, arguing that even in the era of Macdonald’s National Policy, the provinces were “already 
playing a positive, interventionist role in economic development,” complementing Pratt’s (1977) 
contention that the underlying logic of Alberta’s industrial strategy under Peter Lougheed closely 
resembled Ontario’s “manufacturing condition” prevalent at the turn of the century (Armstrong, 1972; 
Nelles, 1974; Traves, 1979). Stevenson (1977) also argued that conflict developed almost immediately 
after 1867 between the federal state and the provincially-based mercantile bourgeoisie, first in central 
Canada and then in the West as those economies developed. Far from arguing that province-building 
was a phenomenon new even in the sense of being unique to the post-war era, Stevenson (1977: 90) 
claimed that “conflict between Ottawa and one or more of the provincial states has been an endemic 
feature of the Canadian political scene... to discuss it in detail would be virtually to write a history of 
Canadian politics.” 
Most legal and constitutional scholars, on the other hand, resisted this interpretation, arguing that 
it constituted an ill-advised return to past perspectives which promoted parochial local politics and 
downplayed universal values such as human rights and multiculturalism (Mallory, 1984; Weiler, 1973). 
Sensitive to such issues, Evenson and Simeon (1978: 173), for example, attributed the rise of both 
province-building and Quebec nationalism to institutional failure, the result being “the weakening of the 
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country-building drive on one hand and the strengthening of the province-building and Quebec nation-
building drives on the other.”  
In some of the better known and most cited essays on the subject, Cairns was prompted by these 
developments to reiterate his own positive views of the role of the provinces in Canadian federalism, 
defending and expanding upon the province-building perspective in several forceful articles on the 
constitution and federalism in the late 1970s. In his well-known “The Judicial Committee and its 
Critics” (1971) and “Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism” (1977), Cairns argued critics 
were misguided in suggesting students of Canadian federalism refrain from searching for answers to 
questions of governance in the constitution (to focus instead upon the nature of the societal pressures 
which constitutional arbiters in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and, later, the Supreme 
Court of Canada faced). In these works, Cairns again brought to the fore the structural and institutional 
determinants of the autonomy of provincial states — this time in their relation to both the federal 
government and Canadian civil society — and stressed the impact this institutional structure, and its 
concomitant elevation of the provinces to co-equal if not superior status vis-à-vis the federal government 
in key areas of social and economic life, had on trajectories of Canadian social, economic and political 
development.  
It is important to stress that “provincialists” did not see the federal government as powerless to 
resist provincial ascendency. As Cairns observed, the assertiveness of the provinces, “after a brief 
transition period, was met by a renewed countervailing assertiveness of the federal role.” This led Cairns 
to conclude that “the resultant federal system can no longer be captured under yesterday’s labels as 
either centralized or decentralized... rather it is characterized by strong government at two levels, with 
the admitted exception of the weaker provincial governments of the Atlantic region” (Cairns, 1979: 
181). Focusing on areas of social policy development, Simeon (1986: 450) also argued that “provincial 
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governments became larger, more confident, [and] more assertive” but qualified this claim lest it be 
interpreted as involving a zero-sum relationship with the federal authority by adding the caveat that 
“attenuation is perhaps too strong a term, at least if it is to be interpreted as federal powerlessness.” 
Just as important, like Cairns, few if any scholars working in the province-building vein 
described it as a general pattern that applied equally to all regions or policy areas. Applying a province-
building lens to the politics of Manitoba, Chorney and Hansen (1985: 7), for example, viewed province-
building to be reflective of regional variations in state capacities, contending the term was “not intended 
to apply indiscriminately to all provinces… nor was it meant to account for all dimensions of federal-
provincial or inter-regional conflict… thus it is a reflection of a real paradox, and not a logical 
contradiction, to claim that ‘province-building’ is both a useful and, at the same time, a limited tool in 
exploring the dynamics of current Manitoba politics.” Along these lines, Chandler and Chandler (1979: 
292) also noted “whether we compare social and resource development or even the specific policies 
within either one of these broad fields, we find there has been no single path of policy evolution and no 
common policy-making process.”  
Province-building, therefore, was a subtle construct. It did not argue that governmental dynamics 
in all areas of social and political life in all regions of the country were identical, nor did it argue that the 
provinces either inherently or intentionally had emerged as superior to the federal government. Rather, 
province-building was a general trend or tendency that encompassed significant variation, with the 
general dynamics of federalism being a pattern in which relative (de)centralization in Canada had come 
to different regions and different policy sectors in ebbs and flows. In most cases, proponents eschewed 
notions of the relative optimality of either centralization or decentralization in their assessments of such 
processes. When they did not, analysts tended to argue that the harmful dynamics of competitive 
federalism invited or necessitated the introduction of institutional means of reconciliation precisely to 
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offset the increased capacity of provinces to go it alone (Cairns, 1979; McMillan and Norrie, 1980; 
Simeon and Conway, 2001; Tupper, 1982).  
 
 
The Young, Faucher, Blais Critique 
 In light of the temporally-dynamic and generally uncelebratory tone of much of the province-
building literature, it is worthwhile to pause in consideration of the extent to which YFB and advocates 
of province-building agreed with each other. Though perhaps not always argued clearly or explicitly, 
neither the majority of province-building theorists nor YFB viewed province-building as being either 
new or indicative of a zero-sum image of federalism. More importantly, neither viewed the dynamics of 
Canadian federalism as necessarily adversarial in the face of any increased provincial capacity to act 
autonomously. However, while both advocates of province-building and YFB resisted the modernity 
thesis, which envisioned the gradual accumulation of power within the federal government, YFB 
seriously doubted the ability — or even the desire — on the part of the provinces to single-handedly take 
the initiative in their social and economic development. It is primarily this disagreement on the role of 
the federal government within the provinces that differentiated YFB from those sympathetic to province-
building.  
 The principal thrust of YFB’s critique of the province-building framework contained two 
elements, one conceptual and one empirical, the latter of which was predicated on six specific points of 
contention. Conceptually, YFB misleadingly argued while formal definitions were “both rare and 
diverse,” those using the concept agreed on two basic features of province-building: (1) it was 
considered to be a recent phenomenon and (2) it was understood to be a general process which has 
occurred in all Canadian provinces (Young, Faucher & Blais, 1984: 785). Empirically, YFB argued:  
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Logically, ‘province-building’ is a collective term which subsumes a 
number of empirical generalizations. These are derived inductively: it is 
perceived, for instance, that provincial administrations have increased in 
size, and this generalization forms part of the set which constitutes 
province-building. So one can isolate several propositions which 
collectively constitute ‘province-building’… First, generalizations often 
ignore important exceptions. Second, changes in the provinces may not 
have affected either state operations or the federal system in the way 
depicted in the province-building image. Third, inadequate account is 
taken of pre-1960 events: discontinuity is often described where none 
exists, and recent change is magnified (Young, Faucher & Blais, 1984: 
786). 
 Paradoxically, given their argument that province-building was not something new to Canadian 
federalism, YFB concluded that what could be defined as province-building activity had, by 1984, 
largely receded from view.2 The final feature of their critique was also somewhat misleading in that 
they argued those who used the concept of province-building were advancing an “anti-federalist” 
concept insofar as they viewed province-building in either or both an antagonistic and celebratory light 
(Young, Faucher and Blais, 1984: 818).  
 With respect to ambiguous reference to the contention that province-building represented a new 
and “general pattern,” the review of the province-building literature provided in the previous section 
demonstrates that (1) few analysts espoused the view that province-building was a recent phenomenon, 
and (2) few held province-building to be a general phenomenon affecting all regions and policy sectors 
equally or simultaneously. Again, contrary to the picture of the province-building literature depicted by 
10 
 
YFB, most analysts writing about province-building were sensitive to the ebb and flow of provincial 
power over time, albeit with many arguing that growth of authority at both levels of government had 
come to a head by the late 1970s —with tensions only exacerbated following the 1976 Quebec 
provincial election, which brought a secessionist government to power in Canada for the first time in a 
century, and the 1980 federal election, after which Ottawa sought to reassert its dominance (Cairns, 
1979; Tupper, 1986).  
Although incorrect, none of these general critiques was central to YFB’s analysis. Rather, upon 
reviewing Chandler and Chandler’s (1979) Public Policy and Provincial Politics, YFB centered their 
critique on a six-fold empirical test of the claims made by province-building adherents. In particular, 
they were concerned with three specific claims: (1) that provincial governments had come of age owing 
to increased responsibilities associated with the welfare state (which resulted in the expansion of 
provincial bureaucracies), (2) that fiscal capacity had increased as a product of jurisdiction over natural 
resources, and (3) that a growing sense of public purpose was accompanied in provincial jurisdictions by 
cabinet orientations toward long-range planning (Chandler & Chandler, 1979: 295).  
YFB’s analysis thus took Chandler and Chandler up on their suggestion that greater empirical 
work was needed to support the image of the provincial state they had outlined. Doing so led YFB to 
conclude that there was no overarching pattern to either the structure or behaviour of provincial 
administrations. Consequently, according to YFB, there was little evidentiary basis for province-
building as a meaningful theoretical concept. The discussion below revisits YFB’s six point criticisms in 
light of the empirical story since 1984 and finds little support for their conclusion refuting the validity of 
the province-building hypothesis. 
Six Specific Criticisms 
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The following sub-sections examine the six specific elements or implications of the YFB critique. 
Each sub-section begins with a statement from YFB of what they alleged to be a central argument made 
by adherents of province-building. These are followed by an analysis of the evidence they marshalled as 
well as new evidence which casts doubt on their conclusions and refutations. 
(1)  “The attitude of the provinces towards the central government has changed: they have come to 
resist federal incursions more staunchly and have increased their self-serving demands upon 
Ottawa.”  
 
 The extent to which federal incursions were resisted by the provinces, as a rule, relates to the 
generalizability of the province-building hypothesis discussed in the previous section. YFB argued first 
that not all federal incursions were resisted and, second, that resistance to federal government 
intervention was not unprecedented. While the irrelevance of the latter point has already been discussed, 
regarding the former argument, the prevalence of three instruments in particular was cited by YFB as 
evidence that the provinces were often quite welcoming towards federal intervention. These were 
conditional grants, initiatives under the purview of the Department of Regional Economic/Industrial 
Expansion (DREE/ DRIE) after 1965, and the screening processes conducted by the Foreign Investment 
Review Agency (FIRA) after 1970.  
 While this may have been accurate in the pre-1984 period, the subsequent history of these 
initiatives is quite revealing of the pendular pattern of Canadian federalism put forward by Black and 
Cairns and others writing from the province-building perspective. With respect to investment screening, 
for example, after becoming the subject of ample criticism from the provinces, FIRA was dissolved in 
1985 and reconstituted as Investment Canada with a considerably relaxed and otherwise reorganized 
mandate (Smythe, 1996). DRIE was similarly dissolved in 1988 after being reorganized in 1987 into 
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three regional development agencies that were arguably much less effective than DREE/DRIE, and 
which were themselves the subject of provincial criticism for this reason (McGee, 1992; Savoie, 1986).3  
 Beyond this, it is worth asking the extent to which those using the province-building perspective 
actually argued that all federal “incursions” would necessarily be resisted. A review of the literature 
points to the contrary. There was an appreciation among many analysts that under the auspices of 
competitive federalism many provinces lacked the means to effectively compete and were therefore 
welcoming of federal assistance and even some direction toward this end. Evenson and Simeon (1978: 
181) argued, for example, “in the growing province-building drive, the specific elements of the impulse 
varies substantially across Canada,” acknowledging, in the Atlantic provinces especially, a welcome 
impetus came from the federal government in the form of transfer payments and DREE grants. Tupper 
(1982) also spoke to this point, contending that, while the Atlantic provinces in particular had been 
welcoming of federal assistance, this did not mean that either the initiative for province-building or its 
underlying rationale had been absent. Arguing the era of modern province-building began with the 
establishment of Nova Scotia’s Industrial Estates Limited in 1957, Tupper (1982) refuted outright the 
claim the Atlantic provinces were exempt from the province-building syndrome: “Like their western 
counterparts… provincial governments in Atlantic Canada have never attributed their economic 
situation solely to such impersonal forces as markets, the uneven impact of technological changes, and 
the accidents of history and geography… [r]ather, federal economic policies have long been viewed as 
indifferent to maritime needs and partially responsible for the secular demise of the Atlantic region” 
(Tupper 1982: 48). Courchene (1995: 4) also argued “the provinces are beginning to act like traditional 
economic nation-states and, in fact, are offering differentiated versions of untraded interdependencies, 
which is consistent with the regional literature... this applies not just to the ‘have’ provinces and Quebec 
but to ‘have-not’ provinces as well.” Indeed, Mathias (1971) and Careless (1977) had observed much 
13 
 
earlier that the kind of “forced growth” policies which characterized both the operations of DREE and 
competitive province-building owed their origins not to provincial policies but to federal initiatives 
beginning in the 1950s.  
 Speaking to Western resistance to federal incursion, Pratt (1977: 149) wrote “prairie economic 
alienation is essentially a hinterland quarrel with a market economy, but, probably inevitably, regional 
protest tends to focus on federal policies that are believed to buttress distortions and on demands for 
various kinds of remedial state intervention.” It is not therefore clear even in the most province-centric 
literature that province-building must be accompanied by animosity between levels of government. As 
Pratt alludes, there is no reason why federal policies would be resisted if they were complementary to 
established provincial policies and policy priorities. Conteh (2013) confirms this in his analysis of 
DREE’s successor agencies. According to Conteh, provincial authorities resist federal assistance only if 
it contradicts their established policy direction, leading to duplication and waste only in these instances. 
(2) “The provinces have greatly increased their financial and human resources, both absolutely and 
relative to the federal government.”  
 
  Although the usual debates regarding how to best measure size of government apply to the 
evaluation of this claim and critique (Christensen and Pallesen, 2008), the extent to which one level of 
government or the other is predominant in terms of financial and human resources is a question that can 
be affirmed or refuted with relative ease. If municipal governments are included in provincial 
government totals, then the above hypothesis above is sustained. YFB conceded this, but stated that not 
all provinces have had such good fortune, arguing in the case of the poorer provinces that a high 
proportion of development financing in the form of conditional transfers meant federal discretion over 
provincial spending. As discussed in the previous section, the latter argument is no longer applicable as 
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most federal funds since 1990 have been block-funded — that is, transferred without or with only 
rudimentary strings attached (Courchene, 1995).  









Table 1: Size of Government in Canada, Federal and Provincial (2012 data) 
 
 FEDERAL PROVINCIAL 
 





AB 29,057 29,356 $42,386 
BC 41,609  - 38,732 $33,363 
MB 17,335  - 17,357 $13,851 
NB 16,127  - 28,855 $7,805 
NF 7,489  - 12,726 $8,664 
NS 24,304  - 11,936 $8,988 
NU 459  - 3,500 $1,663 
NT 1,241  - 4,768 $1,536 
ON 179,873  - 87,851 $109,800 
PE 3,767  - 7,405 $1,573 
QC 84,643  - 88,353 $81,690 
SK 9,719  - 14,738 $11,424 
YT 601  - 4,736 $1032 
TOTAL 416,224 $706,452 350,313 $323,779 
     
Source: Public Accounts; Statistics Canada CANSIM table 183-0002 Public sector employment, 
wages and salaries, based on the month of March. Federal government data includes military 
personnel (including reservists). Canada Post employees are excluded. Colleges, vocational and 
trade institutions and local school boards are embedded in provincial and territorial totals in 
New Brunswick, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Health and social services 
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institutions are embedded in provincial general government in Prince Edward Island. 
 
 
The data reveals there is indeed regional variation in the size of Canadian governments. For 
reasons that will be detailed later on, this is not to suggest that municipalities have become creatures of 
their own, as YFB hinted might have been becoming the case in the mid-1980s. While the federal 
government continues to be larger in terms of both financial and human resources, the data indicates that 
the federal presence is not uniform across Canada and, contrary to a recurring argument in YFB’s 
critique, tends to be less, not more, pronounced in the “have not” provinces.  
 With respect to the quality of the public service, the proportion of graduate degree holders in the 
federal and provincial bureaucracies was more or less equal throughout the 1990s but diverged around 
2007, after which professionalism in the federal bureaucracy increased by 5% to reach 18.47% in 2013, 
while provincial levels grew only 1.6% to reach 15% in 2013.4 However, assuming a concentration of 
federal professionals in Ottawa, it is arguable that provincial governments retain a higher degree of 
professionalism in their respective jurisdictions. Even if we err on the side of caution, the data suggests 
that in every province except Ontario, provincial bureaucracies have tended toward a higher 
concentration of professionals than does the federal bureaucracy (see Table 2). 
 






AB 7.59% 11.86% 
BC 8.33% 12.74% 
MB 9.68% 10.54% 
NB 6.42% 10.14% 
NF 4.76% 8.08% 
NS 9.59% 13.39% 
ON 17.65% 14.04% 
PE 7.85% 9.71% 
QC 10.45% 11.73% 
SK 8.50% 9.46% 
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AVERAGE 9.08% 11.17% 
 
Source: Calculated based on Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey Estimates. 
Data not available for the territories.  
 
While this is not to say that individual provinces have greater capacity for policy-making than 
the federal government (Howlett & Wellstead, 2012), it does suggest that federal policy-making 
capacity is concentrated in the national capital, not distributed geographically across the provinces and 
territories. Young, Faucher and Blais (1984: 794), however, speculated the most highly qualified 
provincial civil servants were concentrated in areas of mandatory as opposed to discretionary spending, 
such as health and education. Yet, with these areas excluded, the relative balance of professionals in 
both levels of government is essentially unchanged; graduate degree holders as a percentage of the 
federal bureaucracy average 5.52% between 1990 and 2013, while graduate degree holders as a 
percentage of provincial bureaucracies average 5.85%. 
(3)  “The scope of provincial public policy has widened enormously, and that intervention, especially in 
the economic realm, has become deep and pervasive.”  
 
 In the area of economic intervention, YFB made five observations. The first was that provincial 
growth in industrial spending in the 1960s and 1970s had not been impressive relative to previous eras. 
Second, industrial spending on the part of the provinces was in any case “dwarfed by federal efforts.” 
Third and relatedly, DREE and DRIE, administered at the federal level and employed in areas of 
provincial jurisdiction, were major agents of regional development that could not be ignored. Fourth, 
while the provinces had been innovative with respect to the rapid establishment of crown corporations in 
the 1970s, commitment to industrial policy in the form of sectoral targeting and assistance to industry 
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had not been impressive and was by no means the exclusive domain of provincial governments. Fifth, 
the perception of provincial intervention in the economy in the 1970s was by and large a product of 
Alberta’s unique position, given its oil wealth, to engage in large-scale industrial development. 
 Due to retrenchment of both levels of government in many of these policy areas in the 1990s, in 
testing the merits of this criticism, it is not terribly useful to measure growth over time, as YFB and 
others did. What is interesting about the pattern of government retrenchment is rather the unevenness 
between the levels of government. Intervention in the economy has taken on a decidedly provincial 
flavour since 1996. While federal subsidies decreased by 29 per cent from 1981 to 2012 to reach $5.3 
billion in 2012, provincial subsidies have increased 105 per cent over the same period to reach $15.6 
billion in 2012.5 While YFB caution with reference to Alberta that such figures can conceal large 
interprovincial differences, there appears to be little in the way of structural explanation for variation by 
province, with Quebec leading in subsidies/GDP followed closely by Prince Edward Island. As Table 3 
demonstrates, in 2009 (the most recent year for which data is available) only in Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia and the Yukon did federal transfers to business exceed provincial transfers.  
Table 3: Government Transfers to Business, Federal and Provincial (2009 data)  
  FEDERAL PROVINCIAL  
    
   (2013 CAD, IN MILLIONS) 
 
 
 AB 370.2 869.1  
 BC 491.5 1,153.2  
 MB 309.6 310.6  
 NB 102.1 185.1  
 NF 144.7 51.1  
 NS 197.9 97.9  
 NT 3.2 6.4  
 NU 3.2 8.5  
 ON 1,751.0 2,357.4  
 PE 54.3 73.4  
 QC 1,030.8 6,521.2  
 SK 305.3 408.5  
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 YT 6.4 5.3  
 AVERAGE 366.9 1,707.2  
 
Source: Calculated based on Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 384-0004 Government sector revenue and 
expenditure, provincial economic accounts, annual. 
 
 In the realm of state-owned enterprises, employment in crown corporations at both levels of 
government has declined since the early 1980s, subsequently increasing, albeit modestly, from 1996 
onward. However, whereas federal crown corporations were traditionally larger, provincial crowns 
experienced less decline throughout the 1980s and have grown more expeditiously since the mid-1990s. 
Provincial crown enterprises now employ 141,544 individuals nation-wide whereas federal crowns 
employ only 100,606. Salaries in provincial enterprises, which include large energy companies, 
healthcare and educational delivery services, are also considerably higher than those paid out to federal 
employees and have grown at a much faster rate, reaching over $10 billion in 2012, as opposed to $5.4 
billion for federal employees. Only Alberta has experienced a drastic decline in crown enterprise 
employment since the early 1980s with only a modest rebound over the past fifteen years.6 
 
(4)  “Provincial policy-making has changed profoundly, to become centralized, planned, and 
coherent.”  
 
 As was the case in previous sections, the extent to which the above hypothesis was advanced by 
those using the province-building concept is debatable. Writing five years after YFB, Chandler and 
Bakvis (1989: 64) argued, for example, that in some contexts the pursuit of policy goals may best be 
achieved through competition between governmental units, while in others it may be accomplished 
through coordination, “nevertheless, the dispersion of power in federal systems and the necessity of 
seeking consensual solutions among a large number of policy actors combine to inhibit the prospects for 
effective planning of long-term economic strategies… in Canada, this implies that industrial policy is 
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more likely to be composed of a series of ad hoc actions and uncoordinated initiatives by both the federal 
and provincial governments, all of which result in policies that lack coherence and comprehensiveness.”  
 A central dimension to this aspect of YFB’s argument was that growth in size and complexity of 
governments did not necessarily translate into increased capacity to engage in planning. Why this 
argument might only apply at the provincial level is not clear. Courchene (1995: 38) did speak to this 
tendency at the federal level, however: “By the early 1990s, the federal government had so overextended 
itself financially that it had little recourse but to downsize and, in the process, to devolve and decentralize 
its power and influence… by devolution, I mean the shift toward embracing markets —deregulation, 
contracting out, privatization, and the like, as reflected in the 1995 budget.” Courchene argued that the 
biggest change yielding decentralization was the shift from Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) to the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1996. In this regard, it is arguable that the provinces have since 
absorbed some of the policy slack resulting from such changes, while not “devolving” to the extent that 
the federal government has. 
 
(5)  “Provinces are most closely linked with the resource sectors, and so is province-building.”  
 
 YFB’s contention with respect to resource policy appears to have been that provincialists, seeing 
province-building as derivative of the constitutional division of powers, were most likely to focus upon 
resource policy in areas such as forestry, mining, and oil and gas which fall largely under provincial 
jurisdiction, or agriculture which is a concurrent federal-provincial power. While rents extracted by 
provincial governments skyrocketed in the 1970s, YFB claimed that many analysts failed to appreciate 
the role played by the federal government in resource policy. Citing the National Energy Program, 
Department of Finance and DREE investment in exploration and extraction, and the crucial role of the 
federal government in trade and transportation, not to mention offshore fisheries and oil and gas (areas of 
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federal jurisdiction), YFB argued that “the simple assumption that jurisdiction over resources makes 
provincial states the principal focus of primary industries, and that these sectors must have a privileged 
spot in provincial plans, is insupportable on the evidence provided to date” (Young, Faucher & Blais, 
1984: 808). 
 Although correct that the federal government had, and continues to have, a large role in primary 
sector expansion, the claim that province-building was most closely connected to resource industries is 
contentious. A significant amount of the literature on province-building was rather on the topic of 
breaking free from comparative advantage by way of competitive “forced growth” policies targeting non-
staples resource industries, from automobile to shoe manufacturing and the provision of a wide range of 
financial and other services (Tupper, 1982 and 1986). Speaking to what may have been new about 
modern province-building (though “resurgent” is probably a better word), Maxwell and Pestieau (1980) 
argued that the character of province-building changed in the 1960s and 1970s to first focus upon 
processed staples (the manufacturing condition) before shifting toward “post-staples” industries (tire 
plants, factories, high-technology etc).7 
 Given developments since, it would seem that the federal government now possesses fewer 
means of industrial intervention. In the realm of fiscal policy, the successor agencies to DREE/DRIE 
have not been major players in infrastructural programs, even where there has been a pronounced federal 
role (Conteh, 2013), while the provinces have increased their discretionary capacities in areas of federal 
and concurrent jurisdiction, namely transportation and foreign trade policy (Kukucha, 2008). Finally, 
speaking to options for industrial policy in the free-trade era, Howse and Chandler (1997: 259) found, 
while support at the federal level for the creation of regional partnerships had been uncertain, particularly 
in light of the 1995 federal budget disparaging direct assistance to businesses, “the provinces, particularly 




(6)  “Province-building conflicts with nation-building: in particular, provincial economic interventions 
fragment the common market and cause significant welfare losses.” 
 While it is certainly the case that many of those writing in the 1970s were justifiably preoccupied 
with the conflictual dynamics of intergovernmental relations in Canada (given the many ongoing 
constitutional referenda, patriation and amendment processes underway at the time), this is not to say 
that this dimension of province-building went unqualified by its proponents (Cairns, 1979). For 
example, although Chandler and Chandler (1979: 295) held that “these tendencies have been 
exacerbated because the federal government has neither effectively accommodated regional interests, 
nor provided consistent representation of non-territorially based interests,” they did not argue that 
province-building was characterized by a preference on the part of the provinces to go-it-alone or 
advance ultimatums; rather “the result has been that conflict resolution and many significant policy 
decisions take place in the federal-provincial arena.” 
With this in mind, the three central ideas critiqued by YFB surrounding the extent to which 
province-building conflicts with country-building were: (1) province-building had resulted in endemic 
conflict between the central government and the provinces; (2) there was an assumption federalism had 
become a zero-sum game, in which goals achieved by one side represented losses for the other; and (3) 
destructive conflict surfaced for the most part in the economic realm, as provincial efforts to build 
diversified economies served to impair the realization of overall common interests (Young, Faucher & 
Blais, 1984: 808). 
 We have already established that the literature at which the YFB critique was aimed was 
generally sensitive to the persistence of province-building over the course of Canadian history, which 
demands recognition that conflict was not perceived as “endemic” to intergovernmental relations in 
Canada but rather viewed as one possible dynamic on a continuum spanning from cooperation to 
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conflict. Thus, province-building and country-building need only be characterized as zero-sum in 
instances where federal and provincial goals are framed as such, which is something of which YFB, 
citing Urquhart, were cognizant. 
 Speaking to the political economy dimension, the thesis presented in item six was most strongly 
articulated by Maxwell and Pestieau (1980), who argued precisely that true country-building necessarily 
embodied centralizing elements, while province-building involved a deliberate attempt to outwit 
comparative advantage. In this sense, initiatives like DREE, in as much as they accommodated 
provincial economic interests over national ones, were viewed as instruments of province-building 
rather than instruments of country-building. It was this understanding of state goals that led Maxwell 
and Pestieau, like YFB, to conclude that province-building and country-building were incompatible in 
the form each took in the late 1970s. However, this view was refuted by Tupper by (1982) in his 
discussion of pervasive intergovernmental cooperation among all levels of government beginning in 
earnest with the 1973 Western Opportunities Conference. Similarly, Savoie (1986) denied the 
incompatibility of province-building and country-building in his discussion of the establishment of the 
DREE-based General Development Agreement (GDA) process.  
 While it would be a mistake to view province-building and country-building as necessarily 
exclusive phenomena, these discussions do speak to the difficulties of coordinating policy goals among 
the two levels of government. The suggestion to be gleaned here is that building at one level of 
government goes on somewhat independently of the other level, as per the constitutional division of 
powers. Thus, while province-building may describe the instances in which the provinces compete with 
Ottawa or are otherwise less willing to make compromises that Ottawa asks of them, it does not describe 




 Insofar as the provincialists could be characterized as anti-federalist, it is worth mentioning that 
very few if any of those using the concept were celebratory of province-building. This is nowhere more 
evident than in the work of Alan Cairns, who was deeply troubled by ineffectiveness, duplication, and 
waste, before becoming cynical about the inability of the “embedded state” to forge coherent policy 
programmes (Cairns, 1986).8 On the political economy side, there was also cause for skepticism. Tupper 
(1982), for example, argued “self-defeating” interprovincial rivalries to secure what was assumed to be 
scarce capital placed significant strains on poorer provinces, strengthening the position of corporations 
while substantially increasing the cost paid by society for investment. McMillan and Norrie (1980) were 
similarly disparaging of the dynamics of competitive federalism, arguing against a particular and 
hyperactive approach to economic governance that had become increasingly viable as a result of the 
1970s resource boom.   
 Much more could be said on the notion that the competitive dynamics of province-building had 
for the most part passed by 1984, though limitations of space preclude an exhaustive discussion. By the 
mid-1990s, it was clear that competitive protectionism between the provinces had long outlasted 
protectionism and competitive behavior on the part of the federal state. On this point, Doern and Tomlin 
(1996: 176) noted that “while federal policies are certainly part of the problem, the emphasis in recent 
years has been on barriers erected by provincial governments… established by various governments in 
the name of provincial industrial policy, or simply as an element of 'province building'.” To this end, 
while the decidedly modest Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) was implemented in 1995, efforts to 
remove interprovincial barriers to trade have been ongoing to the present. 
 To a large extent the concept of “collaborative federalism” replaced that of province-building 
after 1984. Although this perspective, too, is vulnerable to critique for being vague (Cameron and 
Simeon, 2002), notions of reciprocal federalism, in which provincial and national goals are achieved 
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through compromise and reciprocation (Zucker, 1995); open federalism, in which the federal 
government consciously withdraws from country-building (Harmes, 2007); and province-to-province (P-
T-P) collaboration, which envisages collaboration amongst the provinces to the active exclusion of the 
federal government (Lazar, 2008) all reinforce the important provincial role in national development. 
 Some activities of the federal government also reinforced this trend. Institutionally, Courchene 
(1995) has pointed out that the shift from the CAP to the Canada CHST in 1996 has been instrumental in 
reinvigorating province-building. Quebec’s comprehensive childcare program is an illustrative case in 
this regard, in the sense that the province could not have built upon its social welfare model by 
introducing this program under the old CAP system. Thus, the introduction of the CHST, along with the 
1995 federal budget generally, marked to a large degree the retreat of the federal government from any 
latent tendencies toward country-building, at least of the sort that is at odds with provincial designs.9  
Province-Building Re-situated   
 To exploit YFB’s analogy quoted earlier in this article, just as it is possible to have a case of the 
measles and not display the gamut of possible symptoms, province-building and country-building may 
come in several observable varieties or, as the pendulum swings, may show signs of remission. 
Determining what these varieties are has been a task taken up by those interested in the historical 
dynamics of Canadian federalism. Along these lines, Simeon and Robinson (2004) have argued that 
intergovernmental relations in Canada have progressed through a classical phase of “water-tight” 
jurisdictions, a cooperative phase of overlapping jurisdictions characterized by federal dominance, a 
competitive phase whereby overlapping jurisdictions created tension between the levels of government, 
and a collaborative phase of negotiated federalism. Determining why intergovernmental relations have 
taken on these tones in different periods is less clear, but can be informed by constructing a country-
building/province-building typology.   
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 Figure 1 provides such a means for understanding intergovernmental relations in Canada based 
on relative “strength” of state-building in terms of the capacity of each level of government and its 
desire to realize that potential.  
 
Figure 1: Centralist and Decentralist Dynamics of Canadian Federalism  
 
 
 Since exercising state-building suggests incursion into the other level of government’s 
constitutional jurisdiction, the realm of classical federalism is limited to the centre axis and lower right 
quadrant, where both levels of government are considered “weak” insofar as they respect the 
constitutional division of powers. Conversely, collaborative and reciprocal federalism is based on a 
balanced relationship between provincial and federal strength, increasing or decreasing in a one-to-one 
ratio in the upper left quadrant. Competitive federalism results from imbalance, either extant or sought, 
between the actors in the upper left quadrant. The upper right quadrant captures what is essentially state-
building based on national directive, such as the period of “initiative and response” described by Careless 
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(1977), while the lower left quadrant captures non-competitive province-building and other contexts of 
open federalism.  
 As the previous discussion has illustrated, a given level of government may be strong in terms of 
capacity but lack the motivation to engage in state-building. The output measurements discussed for the 
period from 1980 onward suggest that this scenario has tended to predominate in Canada, especially as 
far as the federal government is concerned. Since the mid-1990s, while the federal government has 
demonstrated a preference for informational tools over more direct intervention, the data indicates this 
has not always been the case for many provincial governments (Doern & Tomlin, 1996; Howse & 
Chandler, 1997).  
 The research question for those interested in this subject concerns whether the provinces are the 
primary actors in a given policy field and whether this jurisdictional oversight produces outcomes 
different from those expected in a situation in which the federal government is dominant. This model is 
useful for sorting through this complexity — which YFB argued province-building had glossed over — 





 The aim of this discussion has been two-fold. First, we have resituated the idea of province-
building conceptually within studies of federalism as a framework for understanding relational patterns 
of development as they involve the two orders of Canadian government. Second, we have demonstrated 
that the YFB critique of province-building was both initially misplaced and superseded by subsequent 
events. Given that YFB viewed province-building in the most rigid of terms and subjected its underlying 
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hypotheses to a particularly difficult empirical test, we argue that YFB in some sense caricaturized the 
original project. According to the original province-building conception put forward by such authors as 
Black and Cairns, longitudinal analysis is expected to uncover alternating patterns of cooperation, 
competition, inactivity and mutual isolation. We have argued that this has indeed been the case.  
 “Province-building” is primarily an attitude and secondarily a programme pursued on the part of 
provincial governments to fulfill provincial goals within established constitutional limits, but limits that 
may nevertheless be pushed. Critical to the concept is the notion that governments truly engaged in 
province-building will, if necessary and if resources permit, pursue provincial goals regardless of the 
frictions that may be produced between levels of government. In this sense, province-building is simply 
the provincial analog to country-building undertaken in many non-federal jurisdictions by way of central 
government action. 
Although it is also possible to talk of city-building, region-building, and continent-building, 
given the institutional characteristics of Canadian federalism, province-building is the most likely 
configuration that multi-level governance will take on in Canada. Particularly in light of the fact that the 
federal government has largely retreated over the past two decades from country-building, both in terms 
of political effort and institutional capacity, Canada is remains distinct among federal nations with 
respect to the primacy of its provinces (Clarkson, 2001). If for no other reason than to explore and 
understand the consequences of this characteristic of Canadian federalism on policy-making past, 
present and future, the discipline needs, and should make use of, a concept like province-building.  
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2 Young, Faucher and Blais (1984: 818), for instance, conclude their analysis with the following: 
“perhaps analyzing the concept of province-building is now a sadly outdated enterprise, though useful 
for revealing problems neglected by easy acceptance of the concept. Canada has a new constitutional 
framework, new leaders have emerged, and new problems are imminent, to be managed by the state or 
not. If the concept has served some historical purpose, this has probably now run its course and the use 
of province-building will decline. We think it should.” 
3 On this point, Atkinson (1984: 460) argued that “the provinces have been relatively restrained in the use 
of instruments that establish barriers to trade. Competition for capital occurs, but it too is not excessive 
partly because of the highly specialized, export-oriented nature of the provincial economies. The most 
vexing problem arises when the initiatives of one government, particularly the federal government, 
create, or are perceived to create, outcomes that favour some provinces at the expense of others.” Thus, 
the provinces that are favoured will presumably not resist incursions, but the unevenness of federal 
support was what likely yielded the uneven pattern of conflict across the country. In the sense that 
Atkinson describes, we will not necessarily see conflict with the federal government in the West if we do 
not see collaboration with the federal government in the East.  
4 Based on estimates from the Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey. Data is not available for the 
territorial governments.  
5 Figures are calculated based on Statistics Canada CANSIM tables 183-0004 and 385-0032. Two other 
areas of industrial assistance that warrant some mention are research and development and loans to 
business. Regarding R&D, the figures may however be misleading, given much greater reliance in the 
contemporary period on non-governmental research and development. Whereas federal investment in 
R&D dipped from $4.4 billion in 1994 to $3.8 billion for the years 1997 and 1998, private investment in 
R&D climbed rapidly during this period to reach a peak of $16.5 billion in 2006. Provincial government 
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investment in R&D has always been overshadowed by investment at the federal level but has 
nevertheless climbed steadily since 1981 to reach $1.8 billion in 2013. Federal loans to businesses 
increased dramatically in the 1980s to reach a peak commitment of $28.9 billion in 1985. Since 
subsequently falling to a low of $1.6 billion in 1997, federal loans to businesses have averaged $7.1 
billion per year from 1999 to 2011. Having increased only modestly in the 1980s to reach $7.8 billion in 
1986, provincial loans to businesses surpassed federal levels only briefly in 1997 to peak at a little over 
$7.8 billion from 1999-2000 and average approximately $4.4 billion per year from 1999-2011. 
6 See Statistics Canada CANSIM table 183-0002 Public sector employment, wages and salaries. Based 
on the month of March. 
7 Interestingly, the post-staples variant of province-building, while certainly under way at the time of 
YFB’s writing, only accelerated over the course of the 1980s. Alberta’s 1983 white paper on high-
technology development is perhaps the clearest example of the shift from secondary processing to 
strategies of post-staples diversification, which have been persisted in fits and starts to the present (Le 
Roy and Dufour, 1983). That said, it is worth repeating that it would be erroneous to assume that efforts 
to diversify beyond staples were unique to the post-1980s era, as Stevenson (1979), Nelles (1974) and 
others were well aware.  
8 While sensitive to the fact that province-building has been with us since before confederation, Cairns 
argued in 1979 that the crisis of intergovernmental relations in Canada was “of rather recent vintage.” 
The situation by the late 1970s was thus not province-building under the guise of flexible federalism as 
described by Black and Cairns in (1966), but rather a situation in which “the federal-provincial game” 
had “gotten out of hand” (Cairns 1979: 186-187). 
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9 Granted, while the Martin government later took up a position on ‘social economy,’ the crucial point to 
be made here is that relative centralization and decentralization is fluid, and the empirical case has 
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